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A CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSFIRE: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BRADY LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act1 requires a
chief law enforcement officer to make a reasonable effort to
ascertain whether the sale of a handgun to an individual vio-
lates the law.2 Several recent cases have challenged the leg-
islation as violative of the Fifth and Tenth Amendments of
the Constitution.3 Of the cases decided to date, only one deci-
sion has upheld the constitutionality of the challenged stat-
ute. That decision, rendered in Koog v. United States,4 ap-
plied a distinctly different analytic approach to the question
of whether Congress may pass a law mandating acts by state
or local officials to implement federal regulations. 5
The constitutional issue revisited in all Brady Act litiga-
tion is the proper balance between congressional power under
the Commerce Clause of Article j,6 and the separation of pow-
ers guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.7 The first case
1. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (partially codified in various
parts of 18 U.S.C. § 922).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1993).
A chief law enforcement officer to whom a transferor has provided no-
tice [of a proposed handgun sale]... shall make a reasonable effort to
ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or possession [of a
handgun] would be in violation of the law, including research in
whatever State and local record keeping systems are available and in a
national system designated by the Attorney General.
Id.
3. See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863
F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D.
Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
4. 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
5. Compare Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex.
1994) (aligning principles of "arguably contradictory precedents" on a contin-
uum) with Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994) (finding
the issue fully resolved by New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)).
6. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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holding the Act unconstitutional, Printz v. United States,8
placed heavy reliance on the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in New York v. United States.9 "The plain text of that
opinion and the logical conclusion of its analysis" sufficed to
answer the question of constitutional limits on congressional
power. 10 A noteworthy curtailment in the scope of federal
legislative authority resulted.
The New York holding was also important in Koog v.
United States." However, the court in Koog observed that
"Supreme Court decisions about the Tenth Amendment do
not reflect a pattern of straight line development of a
theme."' 2 Consequently, the court elected to align the "ar-
guably contradictory precedents" on a continuum and deter-
mine where the facts of the current case would fall.13 The
resulting survey spanned two decades of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. 14 Ultimately, the Koog court rejected a "broad
reading" of New York, concluded that the facts more closely
resembled those of FERC v. Mississippi,' 5 and held the Act
consistent with the Tenth Amendment "even though it places
some minimal duties upon state law enforcement officials."
1 6
Koog offers extensive analysis of Tenth Amendment ju-
risprudence and, as previously noted, it stands alone in hold-
ing the Brady Act within congressional power.17 Its effort to
map the "unsteady path" of Tenth Amendment precedent
reaches beyond gun control legislation and implicates the
ability of the federal government to implement national solu-
tions to nationwide problems. This comment explores the
continuum analysis of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence de-
veloped and applied in Koog. Particular scrutiny is given to
8. 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
9. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
10. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513.
11. 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
12. Id. at 1381.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1381-88; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992);
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
15. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
16. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
17. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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its treatment of New York v. United States and the distinc-
tions drawn among prior decisions.' 8 Ultimately, this com-
ment rejects the continuum model in favor of a two-stage
analysis, distinguishing between discrete tenets of state au-
tonomy and state immunity.' 9
Part II of this comment provides a general overview of
the constitutional challenges to the Brady Act and the conclu-
sions of two federal district courts on the question of state
sovereignty as a limit to congressional power.20 The section
also defines the continuum approach adopted in Koog and re-
views the key holdings of the Supreme Court relied upon in
that opinion.21
Part III analyzes the Court's Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence over the past two decades and identifies two under-
lying principles of federalism which have generated much
confusion.22 These principles are then distinguished and ap-
plied to the challenged portion of the Brady Act.2" Ulti-
mately, Koog is criticized as based on an improperly narrow
reading of New York v. United States, and its definition of the
continuum model is rejected.24
Part IV proposes that Koog v. United States be overruled
on appeal because the trial court incorrectly defined and ap-
plied the continuum model.25 It advocates a clear restate-
ment of the nature of Tenth Amendment restrictions on con-
gressional power, and proposes a model restatement, with a
two-step inquiry process.2 6
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Context of the Brady Law
Violent crime is a serious and ongoing concern in Ameri-
can society.27 The decade ending in 1992 witnessed enor-
18. See discussion infra part III.C.
19. See discussion infra part IV.
20. See discussion infra part II.A-D.
21. See discussion infra part II.E.
22. See discussion infra part III.A-B.
23. See discussion infra part III.C.
24. See discussion infra part III.C.2.
25. See discussion infra part IV.
26. See discussion infra part IV.
27. Over 1.9 million violent crimes were reported to law enforcement offi-
cials in the United States during 1992. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 11 (1992).
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mous increases in all forms of personal violence.28 Handguns
were the weapon of choice in over fifty-five percent of the
more than 22,000 murders recorded in 1992.29 Firearms
were also used in forty percent of robberies 30 and twenty-five
percent of aggravated assaults reported during that period.3 '
Such statistics document upward trends in both general vio-
lence and handgun use, but the problems they expose are not
new.
In 1991, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted
equally "cold, stark figures" in its report on the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act.3 2 Within those figures, one par-
ticular event - the 1981 attack on President Ronald Reagan
by John Hinkley, Jr. - was cited as the root of efforts to
establish national regulations on handgun sales.3 3 Former
Press Secretary James Brady was severely wounded in the
attack and, subsequently, became a national spokesperson
for the movement.34 Whether motivated by the individual
tragedy of James Brady or public pressure to break the siege
of violence in America, Congress responded in 1993 by pass-
ing public law 103-159, known popularly as the Brady Hand-
gun Violence Prevention Act.3 5
B. The Content of the Brady Law
Public law 103-159 is an amendment to the Gun Control
Act of 1968 which regulated the manufacture and distribu-
tion of firearms.36 The amendment calls for the eventual im-
plementation of a "national instant criminal background
28. Combined reporting for all violent offenses increased 54% over 1983 re-
porting levels. Id.
29. Id. at 18. Handguns were used in 12,489 murders during the reporting
period. Id. By contrast, all other forms of murder totaled only 10,051 for the
same period. Id.
30. Id. at 29.
31. Id. at 32.
32. H.R. REP. No. 47, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991).
33. Id.
34. See Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1991) (statement of James Brady, Handgun Control, Inc.).
35. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (partially codified in various
parts of 18 U.S.C. § 922).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended in various
sections of 18 & 26 U.S.C.). In 1974, the Supreme Court defined the purpose of
the Act as keeping "firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to
possess them because of age, criminal background or incompetency." Huddle-
ston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 825 (1974).
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check system" for purposes of verifying that a proposed gun
sale does not violate state or federal law.37 Brady also estab-
lishes interim measures, imposing a mandatory five day max-
imum waiting period on handgun sales, 3  and requiring a
chief law enforcement officer to make "a reasonable effort to
ascertain within five business days whether receipt or posses-
sion [of a handgun] would be in violation of the law." 9 The
interim requirements are effective for a maximum of 60
months or until the instant background check system be-
comes operational.4 °
C. The Conflict Within the Brady Law
The interim provisions of the Brady Law have been chal-
lenged in several jurisdictions on constitutional grounds.4 1
The essence of each attack is that, while Congress holds the
power to regulate handgun sales incident to its commerce
power, it may not place the burden of regulatory implementa-
tion upon state or local officials.42 As recently stated by the
Supreme Court, "the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. The
Tenth Amendment thus [requires determination of] . . .
whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a lim-
itation on an Article I power."43
37. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103,
107 Stat. 1541 (1993). Within 60 months of the date of enactment of the Act,
the Attorney General is required to establish an instant check system to be
accessed by sellers via telephone or other electronic means. Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (1993).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1993).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (1993).
41. See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030 (D. Vt. 1994); Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994); McGee v. United States, 863
F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D.
Tex. 1994); Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
42. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (D. Mont.
1994).
43. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
1995] 155
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D. The Courts' Conclusions Regarding the Brady Law
1. Printz v. United States: Mandatory Background
Check is Unconstitutional
a. Printz's Claim
The United States District Court for the District of Mon-
tana was the first to rule on the constitutionality of the Brady
Law." Jay Printz, the Sheriff of Ravalli County, Montana,
brought suit against the United States, seeking a declaratory
judgment that provisions of the Brady Act were unconstitu-
tional.45 He also requested a permanent injunction "on the
ground that its commands to [chief law enforcement officers]
are beyond the powers delegated to Congress by the United
States Constitution, article 1, section 8, and violate the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution."
46
As chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) for the region,
Sheriff Printz argued that the law's interim provisions man-
date some form of background check each time notice of a pro-
posed handgun transfer is submitted by a transferor. 47 Addi-
tionally, when the results of the search indicate that a
proposed handgun transfer would not violate state or federal
law, the CLEO is directed to destroy, within twenty days, any
records pertaining to the transfer. 48 Should the investigation
indicate that the proposed transfer would violate the law, the
CLEO is obligated to notify the transferor that the transfer is
unlawful and, upon request by the transferee, to provide writ-
ten explanation for the determination.4 s Such mandatory
procedures would require the Sheriff to divert limited depart-
mental resources from local activities to implement federal
law.50 Sheriff Printz also contended that violation of the pro-
visions would subject him to criminal penalties under section
924(a)(5) of the Act.5 1
44. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
45. Id. at 1506.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1510-11.
48. Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(B) (1993).
49. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510-11 (D. Mont. 1994).
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(6)(C) (1993).
50. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1511.
51. Id. at 1509.
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The United States argued that the background checks
were not mandatory.52 A CLEO was only required to deter-
mine whether the check was a reasonable expenditure of re-
sources. 53 Thus, the provision was discretionary and did not
violate the Tenth Amendment.5 4
b. The Court's Analysis
The court first turned to the task of statutory interpreta-
tion.55 Plaintiff's contention that the statute's criminal sanc-
tions applied to non-compliant CLEOs was determined to
lack merit.5 6 While the plain language of the Act was "un-
clear on this point," the legislative intent demonstrated that
CLEOs were not subject to criminal penalties for violations of
the Act.5 7 The legislative history of the Act,58 its specific ex-
emption of CLEOs from civil damages, 9 and the rule of len-
ity60 all led the court to conclude that the criminal provisions
were inapplicable to CLEOs.6 '
Although the force of criminal sanctions was lacking, the
court determined that the challenged provisions did, nonethe-
less, mandate that CLEOs perform background checks.62
The legislative history was persuasive once again, as refer-
ences were found "[throughout the House Judiciary Commit-
tee Report" pertaining to the "mandatory nature of... the
52. Id. at 1511.
53. Id.
54. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510-11 (D. Mont. 1994)
55. Prior to reaching the constitutional issue, the court examined questions
of standing and capacity to sue, finding that Plaintiff had a sufficient interest in
the outcome of the litigation to confer standing and held an "inherent right to
bring this suit" co-extensive with his public duties. Id. at 1507-09.
56. Id. at 1510.
57. Id. at 1509-10.
58. The court noted that an earlier version of the Act, which did not require
CLEOs to make reasonable efforts to determine the legality of a gun sale, con-
tained the criminal sanctions at issue. Id. at 1510. Silence in the legislative
history of the subsequent version led the court to conclude that Congress did
not intend to apply the sanctions to CLEOs. Id.
59. Since the Act exempted CLEOs from civil liability, the court considered
exposure to more severe criminal penalties "incongruous." Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Mont. 1994).
60. The lenity rule provides that "ambiguity in the language of a statute
concerning multiple punishment... should be resolved in favor of lenity in
sentencing." BLAcis LAw DICTIONARY 902 (6th ed. 1990). The court determined
that application of the rule in this case would "require[ I that the statute be
construed to be inapplicable [to CLEOs]." Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1510.
61. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1510.
62. Id. at 1512.
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background checks."63 Further, the plain language of the Re-
port implied that checks would be performed. 4 The court
also noted that a proposed amendment changing the word
"shall" to "may" had been rejected by the Judiciary Commit-
tee.65 Consequently, the court determined that the Brady
Law placed three mandatory duties upon CLEOs. 6
A finding that the CLEO's tasks were not discretionary
forced the court to examine the core of the Plaintiff's claim-
the unconstitutional exercise of power by Congress.67 The
court asked whether the federal government could enlist
state officials to implement a federal regulatory program, and
it found its answer in New York v. United States, a Supreme
Court decision.68
[F]rom the plain text of that opinion and the logical con-
clusion of its analysis, [the] court conclude[d] that the as-
certainment/background check provision of the Act ex-
ceed[ed] the powers delegated to Congress... because it
substantially commandeers state executive officers and
indirectly commandeers the legislative processes of the
state to administer a federal program.69
63. Id. The court cited statements from the Summary and Purpose section
("Local law enforcement officials are required to use the waiting period to deter-
mine whether a prospective handgun purchaser has a felony conviction or is
otherwise prohibited from buying a gun"), the Brief Explanation of H.R. 1025
section ("The bill requires local law enforcement officials to make a reasonable
effort to ascertain whether the prospective purchaser is forbidden from buying
the handgun"), and the Section-by-Section Analysis ("This section provides that
before a Federal firearms licensee transfers a firearm to a non-licensee, a back-
ground check of the prospective purchaser will be conducted") as clear indica-
tions of Congress' intention that some form of background check be performed
each time a handgun was sold. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 7, 10-11, 17 (1993)).
64. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1512 (D. Mont. 1994).
In the "Summary and Purpose" section is stated, "Local law enforce-
ment officials are required to use the waiting period to determine
whether a prospective handgun purchaser has a felony conviction or is
otherwise prohibited from buying a gun." Clearly, a determination of
eligibility is required and some form of background check on which to
make the determination is implied by this statement.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 344, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1993).
65. Id.
66. Id. The court held that the Act requires a CLEO to "ascertain whether
receipt of a handgun would be in violation of the law; perform a background
check; and... [either] destroy the statement within twenty days... [or] provide
the reasons for the determination [that the sale would be unlawful]." Id.
67. Id.
68. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
69. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994).
[Vol. 36158
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Thus, within the New York analysis, the court found two sep-
arate bases for holding the Act unconstitutional: (a) its effect
on state executives, and (b) its effect on the state legislatures.
The first basis originated from the principle that local of-
ficials should not be held accountable for unpopular policies
forced upon them which affect their ability to address local
concerns. 70 The second reflected awareness that any regula-
tory program bears costs which must be absorbed by the
state. Since the legislature will be faced with the choice be-
tween raising taxes to fund the program, diverting funds
from other programs, or leaving the responsible department
under-funded, the law indirectly mandates some potentially
unpopular action by state legislators.71
The court concluded that the mandatory background
check requirement, though unconstitutional, was severable
from the remainder of the legislation.72 Consequently, trans-
ferees are still required to execute sworn statements which
transferors must forward to CLEOs. 73 The CLEO, then, may
elect to conduct a check or destroy the statement within
twenty days.74
70. Id. at 1514-15. Justice O'Connor elaborated further on the principle of
accountability in New York:
If the citizens of New York, for example, do not consider [regulation] in
their best interest, they may elect state officials who share their view.
That view can always be preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it
is contrary to the national view, but in such a case it is the Federal
Government that makes the decision in the view of the public, and it
will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision
turns out to be detrimental or unpopular. But where the Federal Gov-
ernment directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will
bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who de-
vised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in
accordance with the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-
empted by federal regulation.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1992).
71. Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1515.
72. Id. at 1519.
73. Id. at 1518.
74. Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1518 (D. Mont. 1994).
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2. Koog v. United States: Mandatory Background
Check is Constitutional
Two weeks after Printz was decided, a second opinion
was rendered on the constitutionality of the Brady Law.75
The facts and legal issues of Koog v. United States were virtu-
ally indistinguishable from Printz.76 The court's reasoning
and result, however, differed dramatically. Koog noted that
the Supreme Court decisions regarding the Tenth Amend-
ment "reflect a series of shifting perspectives on the nature
and breadth of the powers reserved to the states .... Faced
with arguably contradictory precedents, [the] court has no
better guide than simply to align the principles enunciated in
these cases on a continuum and decide where the instant case
falls."77
The continuum developed by the court drew upon seven
Supreme Court decisions spanning nearly twenty years.78
One extreme, identified as Justice Brennan's dissent in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,79 was characterized as sug-
gesting that state sovereignty provided no independent limit
on congressional power 8 0 The Tenth Amendment did no
more than limit Congress to enumerated powers, and protec-
tion of sovereignty interests resided within the political pro-
cess rather than the judiciary.8 1 The continuum's opposite
extreme was identified in New York v. United States. 2 This
position characterized the Tenth Amendment as "ex-
press[ing] a concept of state sovereignty that independently
limits the Congressional exercise of the commerce power."
8 3
75. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
76. Plaintiff brought suit in his official capacity as Sheriff of Val Verde
County, Texas, seeking a declaration that 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) violates the Tenth
Amendment, and seeking a permanent injunction against its enforcement. Id.
at 1377-78.
77. Id. at 1381.
78. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264 (1981); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
79. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
80. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
81. Id. at 1382.
82. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
83. Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1387.
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Between these conflicting views was placed a myriad of opin-
ions, concurrences, and dissents, suggesting that the Tenth
Amendment places some restraints on congressional power,
particularly with respect to "'integral operations,' 'typical' or
'sovereign' functions, or more than 'de minimus' intrusions."8 4
Koog determined that the Brady Law conferred great dis-
cretion on the CLEO because it required only a reasonable
background search under the circumstances; in some in-
stances, a decision to conduct no search at all might be war-
ranted.85 Thus, the court determined the facts most closely
resembled those of FERC v. Mississippi,8 6 where the minimal
intrusion of a federal regulation requiring states to consider
federal standards when adopting utility regulations was
ruled constitutional.8 7 Consequently, the court held the
Brady Act consistent with the Constitution, "even though it
places some minimal duties upon state law enforcement
officials. 88
E. The Continuum Explored
As previously noted, Koog derived its continuum model
from the opinions of seven Supreme Court cases.8 9 Those de-
cisions embody the modern views and approaches of the
Court to the question of state sovereignty as a limit on federal
power. This section will examine each of those cases, begin-
ning with National League of Cities v. Usery.90
1. National League of Cities v. Usery: A Doctrine of
Governmental Immunity Defined
In 1976, the Court considered whether an amendment to
the Federal Labor Standards Act which extended its wage
and hours provisions to state and local government employ-
ees, was a valid exercise of authority under the Commerce
Clause.91 In a 5-to-4 decision, the majority struck down the
84. Id.
85. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. 1994).
86. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
87. Koog, 852 F. Supp. at 1388.
88. Id.
89. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
90. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
91. Id. A 1974 amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act modified its
definition of "employer" to include public agencies. Id. at 838. The amendment
1995]
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amendment, holding that Congress may not "directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions."92 The Court recog-
nized that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to
every state government which may not be impaired by Con-
gress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner."93 The limits imposed by such attributes, however,
were characterized as flexible enough to allow for "temporary
enactments tailored to combat a national emergency.
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, noted that external re-
straints on Congress' plenary power have long been believed
to reside in the political, rather than judicial process.95 Fun-
damental to the dissent was the principle that, where Con-
gress acts within its legitimate power, the Nation and the
States are not co-equals. 96  Precedent dictated that the
proper role for the Court was limited to determining whether
the law was a reasonable regulation of commerce.9 7 Brennan
characterized the majority opinion as "a catastrophic judicial
body blow at Congress' power under the Commerce Clause."98
2. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n: An Immunity Test Refined
In 1981, the Court ruled on challenges to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. 9 After holding
also defined "public agency" to include "the Government of the United States;
the government of a State or political subdivision thereof" or any agency of
those entities. Id. The amendment served to eliminate the general exemption
afforded by the original Act to States and their political subdivisions. Id. Thus,
almost all public employment was subject to the terms of the Act governing
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. Id. at 839.
92. Id. at 852.
93. Id. at 845.
94. Id. at 853.
95. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857-58 (1976) (Brennan,
J., dissenting), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
96. Id. at 859-60.
97. Id. at 861.
98. Id. at 880.
99. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981). The Act established a two-phase program for regulating surface mining
activities, and it created various national performance standards designed to
guard societal and environmental interests against the adverse effects of sur-
face coal mining operations. Id. at 268-69. Plaintiffs (an association of coal
[Vol. 36162
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
that the Act was a legitimate exercise of commerce power, the
Court turned to the question of affirmative limits on that
power.100 The district court had invalidated certain provi-
sions on the ground that they violated the Tenth Amendment
and interfered with the traditional governmental function of
regulating land use.'
The Supreme Court reversed and announced a three-part
test for determining whether legislation was invalid under
National League of Cities: (1) the challenged legislation must
regulate the States as States; (2) the regulation must address
an indisputable attribute of state sovereignty; and (3) compli-
ance must directly impair the State's ability to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions. 0 2 A footnote to the opinion suggests that, even when
the requirements of the test are satisfied, a balancing of state
and federal interests may be required.10 3
The challenged provisions failed to satisfy the require-
ments of the test because they did not directly regulate the
States; the provisions were targeted at individual businesses
and, to the extent that any State action was implicated,
States remained free to conform with federal regulation or be
preempted by federal law.'0 4 Hodel, rendered without dis-
sent, marked a rare moment of general agreement in the
struggle between the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause.
3. FERC v. Mississippi: The Alternative Approach of
"Choice"
One year after Hodel, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of legislation implemented in response to a national
producers, several member companies, four landowners, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and one town) sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the Act
on grounds that its provisions violated the Commerce Clause, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 273.
100. Id. at 283.
101. The district court issued a permanent injunction against enforcement of
the Act, relying on the language of National League of Cities to find that the Act
violated the Tenth Amendment because it displaced State power to structure
"integral operations in areas of traditional functions." Id. at 274.
102. Id. at 287-88.
103. See id. at 288 n.29.
104. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
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energy crisis.10 5 Provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) were challenged by the State of
Mississippi on the grounds that they were "beyond the scope
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and...
constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the
Tenth Amendment."1°6 The majority opinion upheld the pro-
visions, finding that Congress may place procedural require-
ments upon States as a prerequisite to continued activity in
an otherwise preemptable field.'0 7 "[B]ecause the two chal-
lenged Titles simply condition[ed] continued state involve-
ment in a pre-emptible [sic] area on the consideration of fed-
eral proposals, they d[id] not threaten the States' 'separate
and independent existence,'. . . [or] impair the ability of the
States 'to function effectively in a federal system.' 2Y1o8
In dissent, Justice O'Connor urged application of the Ho-
del three-part test to invalidate the provisions.' 0 9 The major-
ity's "choice" approach was characterized as "an absurdity,"
which removed all limits to federal regulation of state govern-
ment since a State could always be presented with a choice
between conformity and preemption." 0 Justice O'Connor
viewed the conscription of "state utility commissions into the
national bureaucratic army" as contrary to the principles of
National League of Cities v. Usery, the values of federalism,
and constitutional history."'
4. EEOC v. Wyoming: The Immunity Test Applied
In 1983 the Court, once again, examined the question of
state sovereignty as a limitation of commerce power.'1 2 A
1974 amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment
105. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
106. Id. at 752. PURPA required state enforcement of standards promul-
gated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and it compelled
consideration of federal rate-making standards and procedures on state com-
missions. Id. at 759.
107. Id. at 771.
108. Id. at 765-66 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 778 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 781-82 (1982). The point was illus-
trated by reference to the prior decision in National League of Cities v. Usery:
"Under the Court's analysis, for example, National League of Cities v. Usery
would have been wrongly decided, because the States could have avoided the
Fair Labor Standards Act by 'choosing' to fire all employees subject to that Act
and to close those branches of state government." Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id. at 775.
112. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
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Act of 1967 (ADEA) extended its prohibitions on age discrimi-
nation to State and Federal Governments. 113 The Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought suit on
behalf of a supervisor for the Wyoming Fish and Game De-
partment who had been involuntarily retired at the age of
55.114 The district court's holding that the "Act violated the
doctrine of Tenth Amendment immunity articulated in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery"115 was reversed by the
Supreme Court.1 1
6
The 5-to-4 decision, applying the three prong analysis of
Hodel, acknowledged that the Act plainly regulated the
States as States, but did not "'directly impair' the State's
ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.' "117 The Court viewed the question
of whether a federal law directly impairs a State's ability to
structure integral operations as one of degree. 118 Since the
State's only interest in the retirement policy was assuring the
physical capabilities of game wardens, and the ADEA would
not impair that objective, the majority found the intrusion
"sufficiently less serious than... National League of Cities so
as to make it unnecessary ... to override Congress' express
choice to extend its regulatory authority to the States."119
113. Id. at 233. The Act prohibited discrimination against any employee or
potential employee on the basis of age except where age was a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the busi-
ness. Id. at 228-29; see also 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1992).
114. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 234-35.
115. Id. at 235.
116. Id. at 243-44.
117. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 237-39 (1983). The second prong of
the Hodel test, requiring that the statute address an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty," was not reached because the third prong proved decisive. Id.
at 238-39. However, an important footnote to the opinion elaborated on the
nature of the employment relationship stating:
A State's employment relationship with its workers can, under certain
circumstances, be one vehicle for the exercise of its core sovereign func-
tions.... [Slome employment decisions are so closely connected to the
execution of underlying sovereign choices that they must be assimi-
lated into them for purposes of the Tenth Amendment. But we are not
to be understood to suggest that every state employment decision
aimed simply at advancing a generalized interest in efficient manage-
ment - even the efficient management of traditional state functions
- should be considered to be an exercise of an "undoubted attribute of
state sovereignty."
Id. at 238 n.11 (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 239.
119. Id.
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In his concurrence, Justice Stevens urged that National
League of Cites v. Usery was improperly decided and should
be reversed. 120 Nothing in the Tenth Amendment, or else-
where in the Constitution, supported a "judicially constructed
limitation on the scope of the federal power granted to Con-
gress by the Commerce Clause."121 This case, like National
League of Cities, involved no more than an attempt by Con-
gress to regulate all segments of the national labor market -
an act squarely within the settled scope of the commerce
power.122 The views of Justice Stevens would prove persua-
sive when the Court next examined the question of sovereign
immunity.123
5. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: The Immunity Test Discarded
Four months after the Court decided National League of
Cities, the San Antonio Transit Authority notified its employ-
ees that it was exempt from overtime obligations under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).' 24 The organization's suc-
cessor, San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
(SAMTA), was subsequently notified by the Department of
Labor that its operations were not immune from application
of the Act.125 SAMTA filed suit against the Secretary of La-
bor, seeking a declaratory judgment that National League of
Cities precluded application of the Act's overtime provisions
to SAMTA operations.126 The District Court entered judg-
ment for SAMTA, holding that public mass-transit fell within
the traditional government functions exempted by National
League of Cities.'27 In reversing, the Supreme Court used the
120. Id. at 249-50 (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 248.
122. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1983).
123. See discussion infra part II.E.5.
124. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 534 (1985).
125. Id.
126. Id. The District Court allowed Garcia, a SAMTA employee, to intervene
as a defendant after staying a civil action for unpaid overtime wages due under
the FLSA. Id.
127. Id. at 535-36. The district court first granted summary judgment for
Plaintiff, from which appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. Id. at 535. Dur-
ing the pendency of that appeal, the Supreme Court decided Transportation
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), which held that a state-owned
railway was not a traditional governmental function. Id. Consequently, the
district court's judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further consid-
[Vol. 36166
STATE SOVEREIGNTY
opportunity to reconsider and reject the principles set forth in
National League of Cities v. Usery.128
A sharply divided Court "reject[ed], as unsound in princi-
ple and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from
federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of
whether a particular governmental function is 'integral' or
'traditional.' "129 The Court confirmed that there are limits
on the power of the federal government to interfere with state
functions.' 30 But such limits are to be found in the political
process - each state's participation in federal governmental
action. 131
[W]e are convinced that the fundamental limitation that
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce
Clause to protect the "States as States" is one of process
rather than one of result. Any substantive restraint on
the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its jus-
tification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation,
and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings
in the national political process rather than to dictate a
"sacred province of state autonomy." 13 2
The Court declined, however, to elaborate further on the na-
ture of any affirmative limits the constitutional structure
might impose on Commerce Clause power.
13 3
Justice Powell, in his dissent, found no justification for
departing from stare decisis and would have applied the stan-
dard of National League of Cities.13 4 He argued that the ma-
jority's opinion "effectively reduce[d] the Tenth Amendment
to meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the
Commerce Clause."'3 5 The National League of Cities test was
characterized as a balancing test which required weighing of
state and federal interests.'3 6 The financial impact and dis-
placement of state control over employees created a compel-
eration. Id. On rehearing, the court again ruled in favor of SAMTA and appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court. Id. at 535-36.
128. Id. at 546-47.
129. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 534 (1985).
130. Id. at 547.
131. Id. at 556.
132. Id. at 554.
133. Id. at 556.
134. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 559 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 560.
136. Id. at 562, 563 n.5.
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ling state interest which justified application of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
13 7
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor noted that "[t]he
true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as States have
legitimate interests which the National Government is bound
to respect even though its laws are supreme."138 Although
definition of the scope of state autonomy has proven difficult,
she remained convinced that it is the Court's duty to reconcile
the concerns of federalism and commerce power when they
conflict.13 9 Justice O'Connor echoed Justice Rehnquist's con-
fident assertion that the Court would, one day, reassume its
constitutional duty.1
40
6. South Carolina v. Baker: The "Political Process"
Protects State Sovereignty
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA) removed the federal income tax exemption for inter-
est earned on long-term state and municipal bonds issued in
unregistered form.' 4 ' The State of South Carolina brought
an original jurisdiction action in the Supreme Court, chal-
lenging section 310(b)(1) as constitutionally invalid under the
Tenth Amendment. 42 Although the Act merely eliminated
tax-exempt status from unregistered bonds, the practical ef-
fect of which was to prohibit states from issuing unregistered
securities, the Court approached the Tenth Amendment
claim as though the Act were an outright ban on issuance of
bearer bonds. 14
3
Though the Court noted that Garcia "left open the possi-
bility that some extraordinary defects in the national political
137. Id. at 578.
138. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 589 (1985).
140. Id.
141. 26 U.S.C. § 103(j)(1) (1982). So-called "bearer bonds" were perceived to
be a significant vehicle for tax evasion and other illegal activities; see Hearings
on H.R. 6300 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
35 (1982) (testimony of John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy).
142. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). The Court appointed a
Special Master who conducted hearings, determined that the challenged provi-
sion was constitutional, and recommended entering judgment for the defend-
ant. Id. at 510-11. South Carolina filed exceptions to the factual findings and




process might render congressional regulation of state activi-
ties invalid under the Tenth Amendment," it declined to fur-
ther define the nature of such defects."' The State's argu-
ment that the statute was passed by "an uninformed
Congress relying upon incomplete information," simply failed
to allege a defect in the operation of the national political pro-
cess. 145 The Court also found that the Act did not comman-
deer the state legislative and administrative process, because
it merely subjected the States to generally applicable federal
regulations.1 46 The fact "[t]hat a State wishing to engage in
certain activity must take administrative and sometimes leg-
islative action to comply with federal standards regulating
that activity . . . present[ed] no constitutional defect."1 47
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia questioned the
Court's reading of Garcia.148 That holding did not establish
the national political process as the States' only constitu-
tional protection against congressional overreach, nor did it
mandate "the demonstration of 'some extraordinary defect' in
the operation of that process [to] justify judicial relief."149
Justice Scalia also agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that
the opinion unnecessarily cast doubt upon FERC v.
Mississippi.150
7. New York v. United States: The 'Constitutional
Structure" Protects State Sovereignty
In 1990, the State of New York brought suit against the
United States, seeking a declaratory judgment that provi-
sions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 were inconsistent with the Constitution. 151
144. Id. at 512.
145. Id. at 512-13 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 101).
146. Id. at 513-15. The Court further noted "[t]he extent to which the Tenth
Amendment claim left open in FERC survives Garcia or poses constitutional
limitations independent of those discussed in Garcia is far from clear." Id. at
513.
147. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1988).
148. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. Both Justices believed that the case could be resolved without refer-
ence to FERC. Id. Thus, the Court's stated uncertainty as to whether FERC
survived the decision in Garcia was better left unaddressed. Id.; see also id. at
529-30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
151. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Act had been
passed in the face of a looming crisis in radioactive waste disposal. Id. at 152-
54. A 1980 Act had authorized the formation of regional disposal compacts
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The Act, based upon a proposal submitted by the National
Governors' Association, mandated that "[elach State shall be
responsible for providing, either by itself or in cooperation
with other States, for the disposal of... low-level radioactive
waste generated within the State."15 2 It also authorized the
States to enter into interstate compacts for establishment
and operation of regional disposal facilities, and established a
timetable for restricting access to existing disposal sites.
153
To encourage state compliance with deadlines, the Act pro-
vided three kinds of incentives: (1) monetary incentives were
available to States achieving certain milestones; (2) access in-
centives, in the form of escalated surcharges and denial of ac-
cess of existing sites, were available as sanctions against
States failing to meet milestones; (3) title incentives obligated
a non-compliant State to take title to, and full liability for, all
waste generated within its borders as soon after January 1,
1996, as the generator notifies the State that the waste is
available for shipment.
1 5 4
The Court found the take title incentives "inconsistent
with the federal structure of our Government established by
the Constitution."1 55 Whether viewed as exceeding the enu-
merated powers of Congress or as violating the state sover-
eignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, "[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or adminis-
ter a federal regulatory program. "156 The Tenth Amendment
contains no textual restraint on congressional power, but it
which, beginning in 1986, would be authorized to restrict access of non-mem-
bers to disposal sites. Id. As a consequence, 31 states faced the prospect of
having no outlet for disposal of waste generated within their borders. Id.
152. Id. (alteration in original).
153. Id. The States in which existing disposal sites were located were au-
thorized to assess a graduated surcharge on waste arriving from outside the
regional compact. Id. At the end of the seven year transitional period, the
States would be allowed to exclude waste generated by non-member States. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 177. The monetary incentives were upheld as a legitimate exer-
cise of congressional power to authorize state burdening of interstate commerce
via surcharge; to lay tax upon the surcharges collected by the States; to condi-
tion receipt of federal funds on compliance with achievement of statutory mile-
stones. Id. at 171-73. The access incentives were upheld as conditional exer-
cises of commerce power authorizing the burdening of interstate commerce. Id.
at 173-74.
156. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). The Court viewed
the question of whether the Act exceeded the scope of congressional power or




confirms that some powers are reserved to the States, and it
directs inquiry into whether a particular "incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I
power."157 One such limitation is found in the framework of
federalism set forth in the Constitution.15
The title incentive offered states a choice between regu-
lating in accord with the terms of the Act, or accepting title
to, possession of, and liability for radioactive waste generated
within their borders. 1 9  However, the Court viewed both
choices as "unconstitutionally coercive regulatory tech-
niques," which provided no real choice at all.' 60
The Court rejected the United States' argument that a
sufficient federal interest could overcome the "Constitution's
prohibition of congressional directives to state govern-
ments."1 6 ' Although noting that prior decisions had acknowl-
edged the balancing of federal and state interests in cases
subjecting state governments to generally applicable federal
laws, the Court stated:
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the
Constitution simply does not give Congress the authority
to require the States to regulate. The Constitution in-
stead gives Congress the authority to regulate matters di-
rectly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation. Where a
federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript state
governments as its agents.' 6 2
In a case like this one, involving the division of authority between fed-
eral and state governments, the two inquires are mirror images of each
other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power
to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by
the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has
not conferred on Congress.
Id.
157. Id. at 157.
158. Id. at 157-59.
159. Id. at 174-75.
160. Id. at 176. "Either way, 'the Act commandeers the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regula-
tory program.'" Id. (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
161. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992).
162. Id. The Court also rejected arguments that the Constitution permits
federal directives to state governments in some circumstances, id. at 177-80,
and that Congress holds a power to resolve interstate commerce disputes analo-
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In his dissent, Justice White asserted that New York had
fully participated in the negotiations which led to the Act,
took various actions in compliance with its requirements,
reaped its full benefit, and "should be estopped from asserting
the unconstitutionality of a provision that seeks merely to en-
sure that, after deriving substantial advantages from the
1985 Act, New York in fact must live up to its bargain."
163
The dissent also challenged the Court's distinction between
statutes regulating states and those generally applicable to
private parties as unsupported by recent Tenth Amendment
cases. 164 Justice White believed the appropriate test to apply
was the political process analysis of Garcia, and here, the
State actively participated in that process and could claim no
defect.16
5
F. The Koog Perspective: A Continuum of Precedents
Koog v. United States relied heavily upon the holdings of
the preceding cases, yet found no clear answer to the question
of whether Congress can mandate acts by state officials pur-
suant to federal regulations. 166 "After reviewing the
Supreme Court's recent decisions, this Court concludes that
no single decision controls the entire spectrum of Tenth
Amendment analysis. Opinions such as New York, Garcia,
and FERC all exist side by side as precedents binding on this
court."167 The Koog court viewed "the various and arguably
contradictory precedents" as "a series of shifting perspectives
on the nature and breadth of the powers reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment[,] leaving lower courts
with few concrete principles to decide cases."' 68 The follow-
ing section analyzes that body of "contradictory" precedent
and applies its underlying principles to challenged provisions
of the Brady Law.
gous to that of the Court's power to resolve conflicts between states, id. at 179-
80.
163. Id. at 198-99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 201-02.
165. Id. at 205-06.
166. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1387 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
167. Id.




Recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court has generated confusion and substantially different in-
terpretations among the lower courts. 16 9 Such consequences,
however, are not surprising given the difficulty the Court has
experienced in identifying the source and nature of state sov-
ereignty. 170 Over the past two decades, phrases such as regu-
lating "States as States,"171 "integral operations," 172 "tradi-
tional governmental functions,"173 "failings in the national
political process,"' 74 and "commandeer[ing state] legis-
lat[ures]" 175 have each been used to mark the state-federal
border.
Such language has also served to obscure the fact that
state sovereignty - as embodied in the Tenth Amendment -
consists of two distinct and analytically separate principles:
state autonomy and state immunity. The Court has not been
blind to this distinction; decisions have incorporated the dif-
ference within their analytic approaches. 176 But the failure
169. Compare Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994)
(finding plain text and logical conclusions of New York v. United States controls)
with Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (rejecting
"broad" reading of New York v. United States on same question).
170. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (5-4 decision) (holding that application of Fair Labor Standards Act to
state employees does not violate Tenth Amendment) with Nat'l League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision) (holding that application of Fair
Labor Standards Act to state employees is prohibited by Tenth Amendment),
overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
171. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), overruled
by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
172. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981) (quoting Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985)).
173. Id.
174. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554
(1985).
175. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (quoting Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
176. Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that
Congress may not require States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program) with Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857-58 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (amending generally applicable regulation, which op-
erates to displace State's ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions, is beyond congressional authority), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). But
cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (holding that Congress may re-
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to articulate the distinction has left courts, such as Koog, un-
certain as to the organizing principles underlying modern
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. 177
A. Autonomy: A Tenet of Political Independence
The political independence and right of self-government
belonging to the States, as States, is so fundamental to the
concept of federalism as to require little elaboration. The
Constitution itself bears witness to the Framers' understand-
ing that the States would continue to exist as separate polit-
ical entities. 171 Similarly, the language of the Tenth Amend-
ment leaves little room for doubt that the States enjoy a full
measure of autonomy: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."179
The Court has offered various interpretations of the
Tenth Amendment's scope and meaning. Most recently, in
New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor stated:
The Tenth Amendment . .. restrains the power of Con-
gress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the
Tenth Amendment itself, which... is essentially a tautol-
ogy. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the
quire state agency to consider federal regulations and conform to certain proce-
dural minima during deliberation).
177. See Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
"[Tihe cases seem to reflect a series of shifting perspectives on the nature and
breadth of the powers reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment leav-
ing lower courts with few concrete principles to decided cases." Id.
178. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof..."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added); "The Congress shall have Power
.. [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (establish-
ing various restrictions on the residual powers of the States); U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2 (extending judicial power to controversies between States, and clearly
distinguishing between citizens and States as entities); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
(requiring each State to accord full faith and credit to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of every other State); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1
(requiring approval of State legislature, as well as Congress, for modifications
of territorial borders); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (securing to each State a guaran-
tee of a republican form of government). This is but a partial list of examples of
the separation between state and federal governments established by the Con-
stitution, and the Framer's recognition of the States as autonomous political
entities.
179. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
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power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States. 8 °
Thus, the line between state and federal power can be viewed
as either a limit on federal power, or a zone of state autonomy
protected by the Tenth Amendment. As characterized in New
York v. United States, "the two inquiries are mirror images of
each other." 18 1
At other times, the Court appears to have disavowed the
existence of a doctrine of state autonomy:
The principle of immunity articulated in National League
of Cities is a functional doctrine.., whose ultimate pur-
pose is not to create a sacred province of state autonomy,
but to insure that the unique benefits of a federal system
in which the States enjoy a "separate and independent
existence," not be lost through undue federal interference
in certain core state functions. 182
However, this statement actually reveals the Court's aware-
ness of the distinction between the discrete principles. Na-
tional League of Cities was a case involving operation of gen-
erally applicable regulations on state functions. 18 3 Once the
determination is made that National League of Cities was an
immunity case, the Court's observation that a doctrine of im-
munity does not "create a sacred province of state autonomy"
is logical. Immunity does not create autonomy. Autonomy
cases involve only the division of power between state and
federal governments, and a violation of state autonomy is an
exercise of power not granted to Congress by the
Constitution.
B. Immunity: A Tenet of Protective Limitation
Some enactments by Congress may be fully within the
scope of power granted by the Commerce Clause, yet, when
applied to the states, serve to impede the states' ability to
function. 8 4 Thus, while such an act would not implicate the
tenet of state autonomy, a zone exists in which states require
180. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
181. Id. at 156.
182. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
183. See discussion supra part II.E.1.
184. For example, in response to a critical and ongoing gasoline shortage,
Congress might implement a national program of fuel rationing, incident to its
commerce power. But, if applied to the states, such legislation would severely
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protection from legitimate exercises of federal power which
would undermine their separate and independent existence.
It is this concept of protective immunity which has so fre-
quently troubled the Court. In the words of Justice
O'Connor, "[tihe Court's jurisprudence in this area has trav-
eled an unsteady path." 185 Beginning with National League
of Cities, the Court made repeated efforts to articulate a test
for application of the principle."8 6 But the task of defining
"integral" or "traditional" governmental functions proved un-
workable, and the Garcia Court finally rejected any test
based on judicial appraisals. 18 7 But even while overruling
National League of Cities, the Garcia Court acknowledged
that "undoubtedly there are" limits on the Federal Govern-
ment's power "to interfere with state functions."'88 Conse-
quently, though the test for such limits remains unclear, the
concept of protective immunity is well established. Congress,
even through a legitimate exercise of its power, may not im-
pede the States' separate and independent existence.
C. Application to Brady: A Question of Autonomy or
Immunity
The initial determination required in Tenth Amendment
analysis is the nature of the limit on congressional power be-
ing claimed by the State. Viewed as a whole, the Brady Act is
an unexceptional exercise of commerce power regulating
sales of handguns. The Federal Government has been regu-
lating the manufacture and sale of handguns for years.'
8 9
This Act merely amends existing generally applicable regula-
tions to require a nationally standardized waiting period and
background check.' 90
Thus characterized, the appeal of applying immunity
analysis is strong. Unless the Act substantially interferes
with the State's separate and independent existence, the reg-
impede their ability to provide adequate essential services, such as police and
fire protection.
185. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
186. See discussion supra part II.E.
187. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47
(1985).
188. Id. at 547.
189. See, e.g., Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213
(1968) (codified as amended in various sections of 18 & 26 U.S.C.).
190. See discussion supra part II.B.
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ulation is within the constitutional power of Congress. Ar-
guably, since many States already have waiting periods and
require some form of background check prior to a handgun
sale, the case could be made that no substantial interference
exists.
Alternatively, the particular regulation challenged may
be viewed as federally mandated job duties for state law en-
forcement officials. As such, they necessarily require a diver-
sion of resources away from other law enforcement activities,
and impair the ability of local officials to perform their local
duties. Even though the Act confers discretion upon each
CLEO to determine what constitutes a reasonable back-
ground search under particular circumstances, it was clearly
the intent of Congress that some form of search be performed
each time a handgun is sold.
The effect is, thus, to commandeer state officials to ad-
minister a federal regulatory program - clearly an issue re-
quiring autonomy analysis. An act of Congress which leaves
the State no alternative to implementation of a federal pro-
gram was held unconstitutional in New York v. United
States.191 So, too, is a statute that affords no alternative to
the ongoing administration of a federal regulatory scheme.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the reach of the
Tenth Amendment protection depends upon which analysis is
applied. Thus, the initial inquiry - autonomy or immunity
- can be decisive of the outcome.
1. The Koog Decision
Not surprisingly, Koog failed to make an analytic distinc-
tion between the tenets of autonomy and immunity. Conse-
quently, the court engaged in a process of fact comparison
that led it to conclude that the Brady Law is constitutional
"even though it places some minimal duties upon state law
enforcement officials."' 92 The court determined that the
"great discretion" the Act conferred upon CLEOs, combined
with the temporary nature of the duties, more closely resem-
bled the obligations imposed under PURPA in FERC v. Mis-
sissippi.9 ' Ironically, while the case selected by the court as
191. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
192. Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
193. Id.
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most similar factually was an autonomy case, the method of
selection led the court to apply an immunity analysis instead.
2. Koog Reconsidered
The Koog court "decline[d] to base its decision on ... a
broad reading of the opinion in New York."194 Even a narrow
reading of the opinion, however, suggests a very different out-
come. New York itself drew a distinction among six of the
seven cases relied upon in Koog. Describing National League
of Cities v. Usery,195 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority,196 EEOC v. Wyoming, 197 and South Caro-
lina v. Baker,198 the Court noted:
Most of our recent cases interpreting the Tenth Amend-
ment have concerned the authority of Congress to subject
state governments to generally applicable laws. ... [New
York v. United States] presents no occasion to apply or re-
visit the holdings of any of these cases, as this is not a
case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same
legislation applicable to private parties.'
99
The comment is noteworthy because the Court clearly distin-
guishes between immunity and autonomy cases, and indi-
cates that the same analysis does not apply to both. Since the
legislation requiring CLEOs to perform background checks
cannot be construed to apply to private parties, it follows that
the proper analysis to apply to Brady is that which was ap-
plied in New York v. United States - autonomy analysis.
Consequently, Koog has only three autonomy cases to
rely upon as precedent: Hodel,20 0 FERC,201 and New York it-
self. Two of these cases, Hodel and FERC, failed to find that
the challenged statutes had commandeered the legislative
processes of the States by compelling them to enact and en-
194. Id.
195. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
196. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
197. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
198. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
199. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (citations omitted).
200. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981). The value of this case as precedent is negligible, however, because it
relied, in part at least, on National League of Cities v. Usery, which was over-
ruled by Garcia. See discussion supra part II.E.5. Further, as National League
of Cities was an immunity case, Hodel's reliance on its analysis was misplaced.
201. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). This case also recognized the
distinction between autonomy and immunity. Id. at 758-59.
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force a federal regulatory program. The reasoning of both,
however, was based upon the fact that Congress was regulat-
ing in an otherwise preemptable field.2 °2 The challenged
statutes merely required States to conform with federal regu-
lations as a prerequisite to continued activity; alternatively,
the States could elect to opt out all together.
The statute at issue in the Brady Act offers no similar
choice. The statute commandeers law enforcement officials
and places mandatory duties upon them.20 3 The States are
not free to opt out of providing law enforcement. Nor are they
free to prevent the sale of handguns within the state. Thus,
they face no alternative to administering a federal regulatory
program. This factual distinction makes the statute at issue
in Brady more egregious than that in either Hodel or FERC.
New York was determined to offer States no real choice, and
in this crucial analytic aspect, Koog is very similar.
A proper reading of New York v. United States precludes
resort to the continuum analysis relied on in Koog. A proper
reading, however, requires distinction between the two dis-
crete tenets embodied in the Tenth Amendment. Koog is not
an immunity case; it is an autonomy case. Inquiries into the
nature of the mandatory duties or the state and federal inter-
ests involved are not required. As New York explained,
"[w]hatever the outer limits of that sovereignty may be, one
thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program."20
4
D. Sovereign Immunity: A Two-Part Inquiry
Perhaps no aspect of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence
has contributed so greatly to the judicial confusion as at-
tempts to define and apply the immunity tenet. National
League of Cities v. Usery established the principle that
"amendments [which] operate to directly displace the States'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions... are not within the author-
202. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 289-91 (1981).
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1993); see also supra text accompanying notes
62-66 & 88.
204. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
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ity granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.2 ° 5 In other words,
sovereign immunity operates to protect the States as States
from overreach by the otherwise legitimate exercise of con-
gressional Commerce Clause power.
But immunity is not autonomy. Thus, an initial determi-
nation that a case implicates the tenet of sovereign immunity
requires a second line of analysis. Attempts to define and ap-
ply this line of analysis have, generally, done more harm than
good. The Court's first attempt occurred in Hodel:
206
[A] claim that congressional commerce power legislation
is invalid under the reasoning of National League of Cities
must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there
must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates
the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation
must address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s]
of state sovereignty." And third, it must be apparent that
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in ar-
eas of traditional governmental functions."
207
Unfortunately, while Hodel refined the immunity test, it was,
in actuality, an autonomy case, and was ill-suited for applica-
tion of its own analysis.
The challenged Act required states to either adopt an en-
vironmental protection plan conforming to federal standards,
or accept preemption by federal law.20 The federal stan-
dards would regulate private actors, but the statute itself
could not be characterized as generally applicable legislation.
As a consequence of failing at the outset to distinguish the
tenets of autonomy and immunity, the Court was first to mis-
apply its own test.20
9
205. Natl League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
206. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
207. Id. at 287-88 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
208. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
209. The Court indicated that the challenge failed the first part of the test -
regulating States as States - because the standards regulated coal mine oper-
ators, and States were not compelled to do anything. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
"If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program that com-
plies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will
be borne by the Federal Government." Id. Since this Act reflects a conditional
preemption of the entire field of surface coal mining, the decision is undoubt-
edly correct. The analysis is flawed, however, because when the Court speaks
of whether a statute compels State action, it invariably refers to the tenet of
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Four years later, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, the Court abandoned all efforts to apply
the National League of Cities /Hodel test.210 Attempts to de-
fine "traditional governmental functions" had failed to yield
any workable organizing principle. 2 11 Returning to the fun-
damental structure of federalism, Garcia noted that the
Framers primarily protected the States through the structure
of government and representation in the political process.21 2
But, once again, the Court mixed analyses of immunity and
autonomy, and, as a result, discarded a workable test.
The distinction between autonomy and immunity might
be expressed as follows: while autonomy requires assessment
of the federal authority to act, immunity requires assessment
of the act's effect upon the State. It is true that the constitu-
tional structure provides a measure of state sovereignty by
securing the States' role in the Federal Government. In es-
sence, this assures state autonomy. It does not follow, how-
ever, that representation in the political process will neces-
sarily and adequately protect the States from injury by
legitimate exercises of congressional power.
The proper inquiry still must look to the effect of federal
action on the State. National League of Cities began by look-
ing at the consequences of applying the Fair Labor Standards
Act to state employees.21 3 Since then, the focus has shifted to
defining types of functions which qualify for immunity. How-
ever, the argument that activity X is a traditional govern-
mental function and, therefore, qualifies for immunity, actu-
ally begs analysis under autonomy principles.214 Since
sovereign immunity serves to protect the state from the ef-
fects of otherwise legitimate congressional action, no organiz-
ing principle can emerge without reference to the effect of the
act on the state function.
autonomy. Thus, the proper focus should have been whether the exercise of
power was legitimate. Immunity analysis was not required.
210. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
211. Id. at 539.
212. Id. at 552.
213. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
214. It may be that activity Xis so inherently a function of the State that its
regulation is, in actuality, regulation of the State itself. If so, the propei in-
quiry is into the nature of authority behind the regulation, rather than the na-
ture of the governmental function.
1995]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The precise nature of the immunity test remains unclear.
South Carolina v. Baker suggests that "Garcia left open the
possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national
political process might render congressional regulation of
state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment."
215
However, neither decision offers any insight as to what might
constitute a defect in the national political process. At this
point it is difficult to imagine the nature of an "extraordinary
defect" since, in Garcia, mere participation of the States in
the structure and process of the Federal Government was
considered adequate protection.
It is likely that the Garcia standard is no more inviting of
definition than was National League of Cities. It is certain,
however, that the National League of Cities standard, with
its focus on effects, better serves the concept of sovereign im-
munity. Ultimately, the proper inquiry must examine the
competing interests of both the State and Federal Govern-
ments. This analysis cannot be done by simple reference to
the adequacy of representation in the political process.
Whether defined in the terms of National League of Cities or
some other interest balancing test, it is clear that a new for-
mulation is needed if the tenet of sovereign immunity is to
serve any future constitutional function.
IV. PROPOSAL
Decisions such as Koog and Printz demonstrate that the
lower courts still struggle with application of Tenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. This is due, in large part, to the
Supreme Court's failure to clearly distinguish and articulate
the principles it has applied in any particular case. Two de-
cades of mixed analysis and conflicting decisions have so con-
fused the issues as to make a clear, comprehensive statement
from the Court imperative. State sovereignty is not a fre-
quently litigated issue. Koog affords the Court an opportu-
nity to fully, and finally, define the principles embodied in the
Tenth Amendment.
On appeal, the Court should reverse the district court's
ruling as an improper reading of New York v. United States.
The district court failed to recognize the distinction, drawn in
New York, between cases involving the authority of Congress
215. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988).
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to subject States to generally applicable laws, and those man-
dating state administration of federal regulations. The re-
quirement that CLEOs perform background checks is a
mandatory duty imposed by federal regulation upon state ad-
ministrative officials. As such, it is inconsistent with the
principle announced in New York v. United States.
The Court's opinion should fully restate the principles in-
corporated in the Tenth Amendment and the appropriate
tests for determining the constitutional validity of congres-
sional acts.
A proposed model analysis follows, which details the two-
part judicial inquiry necessary to ascertain the nature and
scope of state sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amend-
ment, the structure of the Constitution, and the framework of
our federal form of government. As an initial matter, a court
must distinguish between the two separate and distinct prin-
ciples which comprise state sovereignty.
A. State Autonomy: Examine the Exercise of Federal
Power
Sovereign autonomy operates to protect the States as
States. It is rooted in the division of powers created by the
Constitution. It protects the States from federal legislation
which operates directly upon the States in a coercive manner.
Autonomy questions may properly be characterized as either
an invasion of state sovereignty, or an exercise of congres-
sional power not vested in the Federal Government by the
Constitution. In either case, the second inquiry examines
the legitimacy of the federal action. A determination that the
act was, or was not, a legitimate exercise of federal power
concludes the analysis.
B. State Immunity: Examine the Effect Upon the State
Sovereign immunity operates to protect the States from
the effects of legitimate congressional power. It exempts
States from generally applicable laws which would impair
their sovereign nature. Since immunity questions involve
uses of legitimate congressional authority that are harmful to
state sovereignty, the focus of such analysis must consider
the effect of the legislation upon the State. Efforts to exempt
categories of activities as "traditional" or "essential" state
functions are ineffective because they impermissibly trans-
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late the immunity inquiry into autonomy analysis. Immunity
analysis must always begin with an examination of the effect
of a particular statute on a specific state activity.
A second analytic step is required in immunity cases.
The relative interests of the State and Federal Governments
must be weighed. Not all activities performed by the State
will justify immunity from federal regulation. Nor could all
federal regulation be justified regardless of its deleterious ef-
fect on state functions. Though sovereign immunity exists to
protect the States, it is a doctrine of judicially enforced re-
straint on legitimate congressional power. As such, it must
be applied with equal restraint. Applying immunity is proper
only where substantial and unavoidable interference with
state functions occurs without a compelling federal interest.
V. CONCLUSION
Against the backdrop of the Brady Act, this comment has
examined the confusion surrounding the doctrine of state sov-
ereignty. The last two decades of Tenth Amendment juris-
prudence have left the courts confused about the nature and
scope of state sovereignty limits on congressional power.
Even the most recent opinion of the Court led to opposite con-
clusions when applied to the Brady Act. But the nature of
state sovereignty is much larger than gun control. The Tenth
Amendment plays an important role in preserving the federal
structure of our nation. It assures that the Federal Govern-
ment does not absorb the separate and independent States
through a process of legislative osmosis.
In order for the Tenth Amendment to serve its purpose,
it must be an affirmative limiting principle. In its present ill-
defined state, it can be neither a boundary marker for Con-
gress nor a protection secured to the States. Only by clarify-
ing the dual tenets of autonomy and immunity - tenets im-
plicit throughout the Court's opinions - can a workable,
valuable doctrine be established.
Phillip H. Howard
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